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ABSTRACT 
 
Success of recent developments in Asian economic regionalism and free trade 
agreements depends to some significant extent on the continuing role and importance of 
trade of these economies with themselves and also with the world’s major trading blocs. 
The paper reviews especially the case of Korea, Japan and China’s interest in new Asian 
economic regionalism and FTAs, surveys particularly its important trends in international 
trade in the past 35 years and discusses how these trends and patterns will affect the 
Asian 3’s growth and provide the background for more effective implementation of 
ASEAN+3 or even ASEAN+5 or similar bilateral, pluri-lateral and multilateral regional 
economic integrations in the long term. 
 
 
 
1
 
1 Introduction 
 
This paper is focused on the rising trend, heated discussions and growing support, at both 
the government and academic levels, in regional economic integrations in Asia. Special 
attention is paid to the case of Korea as a key player in these new developments. An 
analytical and methodological evaluation of the new Asian economic integration and free 
trade agreement or arrangement (namely ASEAN+3 or the 10 ASEAN countries plus 
China, Korea and Japan) is discussed and comments on its plausibility and viability and 
rival models from the international organisations (such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)) are provided. We suggest that our cliometric methodological analysis and 
forecasting ise useful to study ASEAN+3 policy issues and can be successfully extended 
to evaluative studies of other economic integrations and free trade arrangements in Asia, 
Oceania and other regions or trading blocs. 
  
2 Genesis of the Expanded ASEAN 
 
The ASEAN+3 proposal, also known as the Young-Ho Kim proposal, named after 
Korea’s former Minister of Commerce who first put it forward, was first discussed in the 
mid 1990s. A number of factors can be attributed to its emergence. First, it was the result 
of decades of fast growth and a number of economic, financial and restructuring 
developments in North East Asia and in other major trading blocs in the world. Second, it 
was the result of developments and shifts in focus in North America and the European 
Union in the aftermath of the damaging Asia crisis starting in Thailand in July 1997 and 
its subsequent contagion to a number of ‘once miracle’ economies in East and South East 
Asia, the USSR, and to a lesser extent, North and South Americas and the European 
Union (EU). Third, it was the result of a benign neglect from such international 
organizations as the IMF or the economic power of North America and the EU on the 
plights of crisis countries in Asia and their lack of interest in seriously helping to solve 
the economic, financial and social problems arising from the Asia crisis. 
 
In 2001 and early in 2002, other new developments in East and South East Asia (for 
example, the quick recovery and recurring growth in Korea and the continuing stagnant 
state of the world’s second largest economy, namely Japan) gained prominence and gave 
rise to a number of new Asian economic integrations or regionalisms (NARs) and Asian 
FTAs.  
 
These NARs and FTAs are currently indeed numerous and proliferating at an amazing 
speed at the behest of government leaders especially in the Asian region. They include, to 
name a few, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+5, ASEAN+5+Taiwan, Japan+Singapore, 
Japan+Korea, Japan+Mexico, Korea+Mexico+Chile, Singapore+New Zealand, 
China+Japan+Korea, Hong Kong+New Zealand, and last but not the least, Vietnam+US. 
There was currently even a discussion on the setting up of a North Asian FTA in which 
Japan will play an important part. As at 24 May 2002, a protocol was also being 
negotiated between Washington and Canberra to address key US complaints about the 
Australian market and to prepare for the setting up of a sweeping US-Australia FTA, as 
proposed by the Australian government (Peter Hartcher, 2002), to the dismal of New 
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Zealand which wanted on the other hand a trilateral US-CER (Closer Economic Relations 
between Australia and New Zealand). And on 26 May 2002, there was a suggestion by 
New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark to set up an Australia-New Zealand Economic 
Cooperation (ANZEC) to boost the low-activity 19-year old CER. 
 
The main focus and objective of these NARs and Asian FTAs (as separate from currency 
unions) are to promote trade either among the Asian economies themselves or with the 
membership of other economies outside Asia such as the US, Mexico and Chile in the 
Americas, and Australia and New Zealand in the Oceania. Prominent among these NARs 
and Asian FTAs is the Young-Ho Kim proposal above (and part of it, the ASEAN+1 or 
ASEAN+China FTA) which has a 1,700 million people market, a USD2 trillion GDP, 
and USD1.2 trillion trade). ASEAN+China was endorsed by the 10 leaders of ASEAN in 
Brunei in November 2001 and its details were worked out at a negotiating meeting in 
Beijing in May 2002.  
 
3 New Developments in NARs and FTAs in Asia 
 
Economic regionalism and FTAs are not new concepts in international trade and 
economic relations. The theoretical foundation of regional economic integration and trade 
arrangement (such as customs union and key concepts of trade creation and diversion), 
was expounded more than fifty years ago by such well-known economists as Viner and 
later Nobel Laureate Mundell. Their subsequent applications were adopted by many 
nations to setting up regional and preferential trade arrangements (RTA and PTA). The 
purpose of these arrangements was for assumedly mutual economic gains. It is this 
foundation and perceived benefits that eventually led to current debates on, for example, 
Bhagwati’s dynamic path analysis and Krugman’s study of the link between global 
welfare and the number of trading blocs, and studies on testable hypotheses on mutual 
economic gains. All those studies are based on variations of the computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) analysis, and on trade and investment liberalisation (an objective of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC)) among trading nations. 
 
It is within the concept of economic integration and using Whalley’s six conditions for 
optimal trade arrangement and its subsequent welfare benefits that some authors at the 
APEF (Asia Pacific Economic Forum) conference organized by Kangwon National 
University in Seoul and Chunchon last May came to support a strong Asian FTA 
proposal such as the ASEAN+3 free trading bloc. This bloc is a FTA for 10 members of 
the ASEAN and the Asian 3: China, Japan and South Korea. This FTA is also justified on 
a number of empirical factors. These include (1) the expanded ASEAN’s considerable 
diversities in size, (2) factor endowment, (3) economic structure, (4) trade orientation, (5) 
level of economic development, and (6) social-cultural background (see the conference 
papers and subsequent articles reported in The Journal of the Korean Economy, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, 2001). 
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Given these factors or characteristics of the ASEAN+3, what can bring or link, on the 
economic criterion alone, these widely different rich and poor, developed and developing 
economies together in this NAR?  
 
It is interesting to note that the advocates at the conference cited foreign direct investment 
as the strong linkage between the ASEAN and the other Asian 3 (China, Japan and South 
Korea) and have proved the existence and implications of this linkage with ample data 
and their analysis. These advocates have also come to the conclusion regarding the 
viability of this FTA by noting that, individually or together, the 13 members of the 
ASEAN+3 possess comparative advantage in the world market. This advantage exists in 
both capital and technology intensive goods and in natural resource intensive products 
and labour intensive manufactured goods. Our reservations about the ASEAN+3 are 
given below in Section 5. 
 
4 Korea and the ASEAN+3 
 
Since its introduction, the ASEAN+3 concept and proposal have commanded wide 
attention and support of and also emulation by government leaders in a number of 
countries and regions especially in Asia (see above for a list of some recently proposed or 
discussed Asian or Asian-Oceania NARs and FTAs). Analysts region-wide have also 
shown great interest and provided an enormous amount of commentary. 
 
In the context of international economic relations in the face of major crises (for example, 
the Asia 1997 or the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, this kind of 
popularity of the ASEAN+3 is understandable.  Some reasons can be summarily given 
below. 
 
For many pre-1997-crisis decades,  major ASEAN economies as well as China and Korea 
had performed extremely well in their economic development and growth, in increasing 
economic power and influence, and in improving the living standard of their populations. 
Then came the Asia economic and financial turmoil of 1997 and its damaging 
consequences and contagion to the rest of Asia and beyond. It has been estimated by the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank that 200 million people have been made 
poor (not poorer) by this crisis (see Tran Van Hoa, 2000b). Governments had been 
toppled and the crisis countries’ social order badly distorted as a result. At a conference at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science in October 2000, it was confirmed 
by participants (including IMF officials) that the responses of the international 
organizations to this crisis and its emerging problems had been slow and, worst still, they 
were inappropriate and ineffective for the crisis economies.  
 
While a number of rescue policy initiatives were developed to deal with this 
ineffectiveness, these initiatives were held in abeyance or dropped as it was found in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s that the feared contagion of the Asia crisis to other parts of the 
world, especially, North America and the EU did not significantly eventuate. To some in 
Asia, the world in this case has lost interest in Asia and especially in major Asian 
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economies and their economic and financial problems and solutions even if this interest  
was sorely needed (see also Tran Van Hoa, 2001, and Tran Van Hoa, 2002a). 
 
In this climate of benign neglect or outright indifference from the non-Asia regions, 
growth in China (which was not affected significantly by the Asia crisis) and Korea 
(which was badly affected by it) has strongly and positively rebounded and seems to have 
restored the successes of their pre-crisis economic development and growth. China had a 
growth rate of 8.84, 7.80, 7.05, 8.00 and 7.3 per cent respectively for the years 1997 to 
2001, and Korea posted a rate of 5.01, -6.69, 10.89, 8.82 and 2.5 per cent respectively for 
the same period (ICSEAD, 2002). The same recovery cannot be said about Japan which 
has had a declining growth since the early 1990s with 2 weak rebounds in the mid- and 
late-1990s (see Figure 1). In 2001, Japan’s growth was still negative at -0.05 per cent, 
according to the 2002 estimate of the ICSEAD. The begin neglect by non-Asia countries 
on Asia’s problems and issues and the stronger than expected growth of China and Korea 
are the twin forces affecting, to a significant extent in our view, the proposals to set up 
various NARs and Asian FTAs in recent years. 
 
  
Figure 1: Growth of Japan, China and Korea
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Source: ICSEAD, 2002. 
 
 
In addition to the factors above, the economic slowdown in North America and 
subsequently in the EU during 2001 and early in 2002 had caused concern not only to the 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, with his responses in announcing 
repeated cuts of interest rates (a simplistic one-instrument monetary solution according to 
many macroeconomic experts), but also to other countries’ treasurers who also 
announced their similar interest rate cuts). The 11 September 2001 crisis and the 
crowding-out effect on resources of the coalition’s war on international terrorism has not 
positively contributed to the health and growth of the economies of North America and 
the EU either. And this issues will remain so for a few years. 
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In contrast, in the first quarter of 2002, Korea’s economy was reported to have grown 
faster than expected, due to record low interest rates and tax cuts that had fuelled a 
spending boom or consumption-led growth in the country. Asia’s fourth largest economy 
expanded 5.7 per cent in the three months to 31 March 2002 from a year earlier (as 
reported by Korea’s central bank). This was the fastest since the third quarter of 2000 and 
beat economists’ expectations of a 5 per cent rise. In addition, Korea avoided the 
recession that struck neighbouring Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan in 2001, 
and was expected to outpace most of Asia again in 2002. The Bank of Korea expected 
growth of 5.7 per cent for the full year, almost double 2001’s 2.5-3 per cent expansion 
(Seyoon Kim, 2002). 
 
This combined effect of a declining growth of the US economy and the EU and strong 
growth in Korea and China again lends more support to the development and popularity 
of ASEAN+3 or even ASEAN+5 and other variations.  
 
5 Challenges to NARs and Asian FTAs 
 
The creation of NARs and Asian FTAs (or more specifically ASEAN+3) seems to be 
amply justified on the reasons briefly described above. And, as a result, its has had the 
support of not only academics and economic analysts but also recent developments in 
major countries in Asia, North America and the EU. In our view however, these  NARs 
and Asian FTAs are constrained, by virtue of the composition of their member countries, 
by their continuing historical and forecast patterns of international trade and traded-
related growth and other non-economic factors.  
 
Thus, in principle, we have sympathy for the creation of an expanded FTA such as the 
ASEAN+3. However, the very fact that the diversified nature of these 13 economies that 
has been used to justify the ASEAN+3 advocates’ arguments may well be the real 
obstacle to this FTA. We therefore have some reservations and also suggestions about 
these integrations or regionalisms as amplified below.  
 
First, the ASEAN+3, while including the world’s second richest country and its most 
likely backer of reserves and emergency funds (namely, Japan), is on the other hand a 
real melting pot of more than 50 per cent of the world’s population, embracing three of 
the world’s great religions, having more than two-thirds of the world’s income, and 
possessing histories that can be a few decades old (for example, Brunei and Singapore) or 
millennia old (China).  
 
In a number of our recent books (Tran Van Hoa, 2001 and 2002a), it was reported that 
economic management policies of major ASEAN economies and Japan, while ostensibly 
Westernised in nature, have been nurtured and formulated more by these economies’ 
traditions, histories and social construct and less by modern Western economic 
management theories. The outcomes of these influences are Japanese-style, Chinese-
style, Singapore-style,  Korean Japanese-style free markets or even a system of free-
market with socialist orientation as in the case of Vietnam. If these are the outcomes of 
current economic management in the countries of ASEAN+3, the practical working of 
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this Asian FTA may have many more obstacles than its designers, supporters or policy-
makers had in mind.  
 
Second, while the current economic solidarity and collaboration among Asia’s 3 largest 
economies are well documented, their rivalry or ultra-competitive relationship can go 
back to decades (1910-1945 in the case of Korea and Japan) or to centuries (in the case of 
China and other neighbouring countries). It is the lingering inheritance of this long-
standing relationship or rivalry that sees Japan’s present concern on the rise of China and 
Korea in world trade and development and may have some impact on the working of 
ASEAN+3 (see also Brendan Pearson, 2002).  
   
Third, from an empirical context, the trends in international trade of the Asian 3 with the 
world’s trading blocs do not seem to support in this case the strong viability of this FTA 
in the long term. In fact, the trends in current account of China, Japan and especially 
Korea (see Figure 2) had been declining faster and further after the 1997 Asia crisis. Also 
from Figure 2, Korea seems to have achieved growth at the expense of huge external 
debts through trade deficits or negative current account. 
  
 
Figure 2: Current Account of Japan, China and Korea
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   Source: ICSEAD, 2002. 
 
 
Fourth, and perhaps more crucially, other fundamental economic issues of an expanded 
ASEAN one has to bear in mind are that the ASEAN and the Asian 3’s bilateral trade 
have and will be more closely linked to North America and the EU. In this context, while 
ASEAN+3 member countries’ trade both in volume and in share is crucial for its success, 
the shares of China, Japan and South Korea in ASEAN’s imports had increased by about 
10 per cent during the last 34 years, its exports were small compared to those of the US 
and the EU and, importantly, continually declining – from 46 per cent in 1967 to 34 per 
cent in 1999 for exports (see Figures 3 to 6). Also importantly, ASEAN’s imports from 
the US and EU were mainly and crucially in hi-tech goods (see below) which were 
needed to support their trade (exports), growth and development. 
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From these figures, in 1999 for example, while ASEAN’s exports to the US accounted 
for 35.0 per cent (USD75.7 billion and a rising trend since 1991 with 26.4 per cent) and 
to the EU 22.9 per cent (USD49.5 billion and a slight rising trend since 1995 with 20.9 
per cent) of its total exports, ASEAN’s exports to Japan reached only 19.9 per cent or 
USD42.9 billion (an almost continuous decline from 30.7 per cent in 1990), to Korea 5.3 
per cent or USD11.4 billion (a fairly stable proportion from 1990), to enlarged China 
10.0 per cent or USD21.7 billion (a fairly stable share from 1994), and importantly to the 
OPEC 4.4 per cent or USD9.5 billion (a falling trend since 1990), the fourth highest 
export market among the seven trading blocs for the ASEAN.  
 
Also in 1999, while ASEAN’s import shares from Japan, Korea and enlarged China 
accounted for, respectively, 30.5 per cent or USD51.9 billion (a decline from 36.3 per 
cent in 1994), 9.6 per cent or USD16.7 billion (a slight rise from 1997 with 8.5 per cent 
then) and 7.3 per cent or USD11.6 billion (an almost one per cent increase since 1994), 
the share to the US was still 21.5 per cent or USD36.5 billion, the EU 17.1 per cent or 
USD29.1 billion, and the OPEC 12.4 per cent or USD21.1 billion.   
 
If these trends in ASEAN’s exports and imports both by volume by share continue to the 
future by design or by need, there will be a real danger that the AESAN+3 will be 
dependent on the two markets of the US and the EU for the member countries’ 
sustainable growth and not with its intra-trade. This will weaken the argument in support 
of  a viable and sustainable ASEAN+3. 
 
 
Figure 3: ASEAN's Exports to Seven Major Trading Blocs
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Figure 4: ASEAN's Exports to Seven Major Trading Blocs 
(Share)
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Figure 5: ASEAN's Imports from Seven Major Trading Blocs
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     Source: For Figures 3-6, 2001 CHELEM-CEPII database. 
 
 
Fifth, in terms of trade and growth dependency, the ASEAN+3 issues become more 
serious when we note from our analysis of the trends of tradable commodities, based also 
on CHELEM-CEPII international trade data (see for example, Tran Van Hoa, 2000a), 
that ASEAN+3 trade with the US and the EU involves mainly commodities of a high-
tech nature (e.g., metal products and chemicals). The implications are that to support their 
development and growth, the ASEAN+3 need new technology transfer from the US and 
the EU. This technology-transfer characteristics of ASEAN+3 trade will not be changed 
or be allowed to be changed by governments substantially in the foreseeable future 
especially in the face of increasing globalisation and international competitiveness (see 
Tran Van Hoa, 2002b). 
 
Finally, with the current (as at May 2002) weakness of the US dollar on the world 
currency markets, the ASEAN+3 and the global economy would also have to face and 
embrace a tougher world export market. This should have important implications on the 
trends of international trade for the ASEAN as well as China, Korea and Japan in the 
months to come. This would further weaken the arguments in support of a viable and 
sustainable ASEAN+3. 
 
6 Responses to the ASEAN+3 from the IMF 
 
In view of the establishment of the ASEAN+3 (and other Asian FTA variations) and its 
inherent economic issues and problems, we may legitimately ask whether the structure or 
policies of some functions of the existing international organizations such as the APEC, 
the WTO or even the IMF can be amended or special divisions of them should be set up 
to accommodate the concerns and designs by the ASEAN+3 trade strategists and policy 
Figure 6: ASEAN's Imports from Seven Major Trading Blocs (Share)
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makers in dealing with Asia’s contemporary economic issues and problems. The 
perceived effect of this argument is that ASEAN+3 is not necessary, as some executives 
of the international organizations have advocated. 
 
The reasons for this suggestion are that, first, to some, the emergence of the damaging 
Asia crisis in 1997 and its subsequent contagion were simply the outcome of a volatile 
international capital market that did not have proper prudential controls. Second, the 
impact of this crisis was still lingering, more than five years on, in Asia because the 
rescue and reform packages that were imposed by the IMF on the crisis economies were 
based on wrong diagnosis. As a result, wrong and ineffective prescriptions were 
recommended. It has been argued that this problem can be solved with more appropriate 
rescue policies by the IMF and, as a result, not by setting up an ASEAN+3 that may the 
effect of diluting some of the functions of the IMF, the WTO or even the APEC. 
 
The advocates of this solution suggest the setting up of a specialist division at the APEC, 
WTO or IMF, with a deep and proper understanding and expertise of Asian economies 
and societies in general and of ASEAN+3 aspects and issues in particular. To them, this 
solution may go a long way towards promoting economic growth and development and 
trade and investment in Asia itself and vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
Above, we have briefly surveyed the rapid emergence of the ASEAN+3 and other 
variations of NARs and FTAs in Asia and Oceania in very recent months and the reasons 
which have been put forward to support them and the challenges or obstacles they 
possibly have to face and deal with for a successful implementation of these NARs and 
FTAs.  
 
On the one hand, these arguments do seem to be reasonable responses to the legitimate 
needs of major Asian economies such as Korea, Japan and China, especially with their 
experiences from the 1997 Asia crisis and subsequent ineffective rescue policies from the 
IMF and also from the lack of interest from North America and the EU since early in 
2000s. However, ASEAN+3 and their variations do have problems inherent in their 
member countries’ economic, social and political make-up and ages-old ultra-competitive 
relationship and in their historical and future patterns of trade with the world’s major 
trading blocs which continue to indicate the necessity of ASEAN’s strong trade with 
North America and the EU and not the Asian 3 especially in hi-tech commodities. 
 
On the other hand, the setting up of a special division of the IMF to handle Asian issues 
and problems may have a consistency in structure and function and may answer some 
concerns of the ASEAN+3 advocates. This solution would however be regarded by 
ASEAN+3 advocates especially from Korea as inadequate responses to future similar 
major economic or financial crises in ASEAN+3 countries as recent past experiences 
have clearly shown and, importantly, to the wishes of ASEAN+3 economies who have 
achieved spectacularly strong development and growth in the past decades. Recent 
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economic and financial crises are to them simply temporary setbacks with no random 
walk or permanent effects.  
 
The whole development of Asian economic integration in its various bilateral, pluri-
lateral and multilateral forms including currency unions with the express purposes of 
trade liberalisation and welfare improvement for member countries needs further active 
research and discussions. 
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